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This thesis will provide Marine Corps acquisitions and communications personnel a 
general understanding of wireless communications capabilities, financial feasibility, 
benefits and the risks of implementing a wireless solution into the current existing 
communications infrastructure in particular, the Combat Operations Center (COC) 
CapSet models already employed and deployed throughout the Marine Corps Air Ground 
Task Force. The content of this thesis is of an unclassified nature. This thesis is intended 
to serve as a reference for acquisitions or communications personnel dealing with the 
acquisition, procurement, planning, and implementation of wireless technologies in the 
Marine Corps, so that they will be able to intelligently articulate the financial feasibility, 
benefits, and risks of adopting or implementing a wireless solution to the Marine Corps 
Enterprise Network and COC infrastructure, and make informed decisions on the subject. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B.  PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................2 
C.  PURPOSE STATEMENT ...............................................................................3 
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................3 
E.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS ........................................5 
F.  RESEARCH METHODS ................................................................................6 
G.  PROPOSED DATA, OBSERVATION, AND ANALYSIS METHODS.....6 
H.  POTENTIAL BENEFITS, LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS .....6 
I.  CHAPTER OUTLINE.....................................................................................7 
II.  BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF WIRELESS NETWORKING 
TECHNOLOGY ..........................................................................................................9 
A.  BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................9 
B.  WIRELESS FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE ........................................11 
1.  The OSI Model ...................................................................................11 
2.  Radio Frequency Components and Operation................................14 
3.  Radio Frequency Signal Characteristics .........................................15 
4.  How Radio Frequencies Behave .......................................................15 
5.  RF Spectrum.......................................................................................17 
C.  STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS ..............................................................19 
D.  TYPES OF WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES ..............................................20 
1.  EEE 802.11a........................................................................................20 
2.  IEEE 802.11b ......................................................................................20 
3.  IEEE 802.11g ......................................................................................20 
4.  IEEE 802.11n ......................................................................................20 
5.  IEEE 802.11ac ....................................................................................21 
6.  IEEE 802.16 ........................................................................................21 
7.  Bluetooth .............................................................................................21 
8.  Wave Relay .........................................................................................22 
E.  WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS.............................................................23 
1.  Benefits of Wireless Solutions ...........................................................23 
2.  The Risks of Wireless.........................................................................24 
3.  Security Concerns and Threats ........................................................25 
a.  Types of Attacks ......................................................................25 
4.  Vulnerabilities and Limitations of Wireless Networks ..................27 
5.  Impacts ................................................................................................28 
6.  Security Controls ...............................................................................28 
III.  DISCUSSION OF THE CURRENT MARINE CORPS COC ..............................29 
A.  BACKGROUND ............................................................................................29 
B.  USMC GUIDANCE ON WIRELESS NETWORKS AND DEVICES .....29 
C.  DOD GUIDANCE ON USE OF COMMERCIAL WLAN DEVICES .....31 
 viii
D.  CURRENT USMC COC SOLUTIONS .......................................................33 
E.  USMC IT BUDGET ANALYSIS .................................................................36 
1.  Current Marine Corps IT Procurement and R&D Programs ......39 
a.  Marine Corps Command and Control Modernization: .........39 
b.  Marine Corps Radio and Switching Modernization: ............39 
IV.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF USMC EXISTING WIRED COC VS. 
WIRELESS .................................................................................................................41 
A.  SWOT ANALYSIS WIRELESS VS WIRED COC ...................................41 

















C.  COST ANALYSIS WIRELESS VS WIRED COC ....................................51 
1.  Manpower Cost Savings ....................................................................51 
a.  Current Manpower ..................................................................52 
b.  Wireless Manpower (half of current manpower)...................52 
2.  Maintenance Cost Savings ................................................................52 
a.  Current Maintenance ..............................................................53 
b.  Projected Maintenance ...........................................................53 
3.  Transportation Cost Savings ............................................................53 
a.  Current Transportation ..........................................................53 
b.  Projected Transportation ........................................................54 
4.  Miscellaneous Operating Expenses ..................................................54 
a.  Current Miscellaneous ............................................................54 
b.  Projected Miscellaneous .........................................................55 
5.  Total Cost Savings..............................................................................55 
6.  Payback Period...................................................................................56 
D.  REAL OPTIONS ...........................................................................................56 
1.  Keeping Current COC CapSets .......................................................56 
a.  Strengths ..................................................................................56 
b.  Weaknesses ..............................................................................56 




3.  Combining Both Wired and Wireless Solutions .............................57 
a.  Strengths ..................................................................................57 
b.  Weaknesses ..............................................................................57 
4.  Other Possible Solutions ....................................................................58 
a.  Using the Cloud .......................................................................58 
V.  SUMMARY ................................................................................................................59 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................63 













THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Wireless network picture (From Brain et al., 2013) ........................................10 
Figure 2.  OSI Model and 802.11 (From Wild Packets, n.d.) ..........................................13 
Figure 3.  Wi-Fi Radio Spectrum and Services Chart  (From U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2003) .............................................................................................18 
Figure 4.  Wave Relay Architecture (After www.persistent.com, 2013) .........................22 
Figure 5.  COC CapSet III (From USMC, 2005) .............................................................34 
Figure 6.  COC CapSet IV (From USMC, 2005) .............................................................35 
Figure 7.  DON FY 2014 Budget Overview (Office of the Secretary of the Navy  
Financial Management and Comptroller, 2013) ..............................................37 
Figure 8.  DON 2014 Appropriations Summary (2013). .................................................38 
Figure 9.  Wired CapSet (www.docstoc.com, n.d.) ..........................................................42 
Figure 10.  (From www.howtodocomputing.blogspot.com, n.d.) ......................................47 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  OSI Model (After Coleman & Westcott, 2012) ...............................................12 
Table 2.  IAED Zones and devices that do not apply (After IAED, 2007). ....................31 
Table 3.  Current Manpower and Wireless Manpower costs ..........................................52 
Table 4.  Current Maintenance and Wireless Maintenance Costs ..................................53 
Table 5.  Current Transportation and Wireless Transportation Costs .............................54 
Table 6.  Current Miscellaneous and Wireless Miscellaneous Costs .............................55 
Table 7.  Total Cost Savings ...........................................................................................55 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
AO Area of Operations 
AP Access Point 
CapSet Capability Set 
COC Command Operations Center 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
DAA Designated Accrediting Authority 
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 
DITSCAP DoD Information Technology Security Certification and 
 Accreditation Process 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDD Department of Defense Directive 
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards 
GIG Global Information Grid 
RF Radio Frequency 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IA Information Assurance 
IAED Information Assurance Enterprise Directive 
IP Internet Protocol 
IT Information Technology 
KM Knowledge Management 
LAN Local Area Network 
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 
MANET Mobile Ad-hoc Network 
MCEN Marine Corps Enterprise Network 
MCNOSC Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Command 
MCS MAGTF Communications Systems 
MCTSSA Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity 
MSC Major Subordinate Command 
 xvi
NECC Net-Enabled Command Capability 
NCW Network Centric Warfare 
NIPRNet Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
NLOS Non-Line of Sight 
NOC Network Operations Center 
NOTM Network On-the-Move 
OCO Overseas Contingency Operations 
ODFM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 





RF Radio Frequency 
RFC Request For Comments 
SBU Sensitive But Unclassified 
SIPRNet Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
STEP Standardized Tactical Entry Point 
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats 
TDS Tactical Data Systems 
TOC Tactical Operations Center 
UOC Unit Operations Center 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network 
WIDS Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems 
WIMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
WI-FI Wireless Fidelity 
WIPS Wireless Internet Protection System 




I would like to thank all the professors and students in the GSOIS department at 
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, for their professionalism, knowledge, 
and support in helping me with this thesis project. I would also like to give special thanks 
to my thesis advisor, Dr. Bordetsky, for his time, wisdom, and help in creating a 
graduate-level thesis that may potentially help the Marine Corps organization and/or 
serve as a reliable reference, or secondary research document, for further exploration 
research. 
 xviii





In 2010, the Marine Corps released the Marine Corps War Fighting Publication 
(MCWP) 3–40.3, which details the doctrine and procedures for employment of 
communications systems that enable and support the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) on the battlefield. MCWP 3–40.3 (2010) stated that the MAGTF 
communications system (MCS) needed to satisfy all Command and Control (C2) needs of 
the expeditionary warfighters and MAGTF echelons on the battlefield. MCWP 3–40.3 
(2010) also states that the MAGTF’s success in a dynamic and rapidly changing C2 
environment, depended on employing a communications system that would satisfy the 
need for information and “provide MAGTF commanders and their staffs with the tools 
necessary to collect, process, analyze, and exchange information rapidly in support of 
operations planning and execution.” This MCS capability was to be employed in a 
manner that would not adversely affect the MAGTF’s freedom of action and mobility, in 
keeping with the Marine Corps communication’s doctrine of providing a reliable, 
flexible, responsive, timely, and configurable communications architecture (MCWP 3–
40.3, 2010). 
The Marine Corps’ previous solution to bridge a gap created by the advancement 
and constant change of technology, demand, and security in the C2 environment, was the 
Command Operations Center (COC) Capability Set (CapSet) manufactured by General 
Dynamics Electronics Division. The COC CapSet is an operations facility utilized at 
multiple echelons of the MAGTF to execute C2 functions. The CapSet suites are highly 
mobile and scalable based on the size of the unit and are hardwired with media and 
communications technology and their own power and transportation trailers. The system 
supports Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) IP Data (formerly known as NIPRNET), 
Secret IP Data (formerly known as SIPRNET), and coalition networks.  
A perceived gap in the MCS that exists at the time of the writing of this research 
paper is the lack of a wireless communications solution that can be securely deployed on 
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the battlefield or in a tactical environment. Other Department of Defense organizations 
such as the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army have already adopted some form of wireless 
solution in their tactical COCs. The Marine Corps has yet to implement the same wireless 
communications solution due to possible budgetary and feasibility constraints, the 
organization’s current communications doctrine, equipment and capabilities, or perhaps a 
lack of understanding and knowledge of 802.11 wireless technologies.  
Based upon requests for research proposals from the Marine Corps Systems 
Command, Marine Corps’ units have indicated that wireless capability would be 
beneficial. However, the Marine Corps’ units have not been able to precisely articulate 
the feasibility, costs, and risks associated with implementing a wireless network in 
tactical COCs. This is a problem because current and projected budget constraints are 
likely to reduce the Marine Corps’ ability to acquire new Information Technology 
Systems that will continue to provide the warfighters with the necessary IT capabilities 
needed to meet the challenges of dynamic operating environments for current and future 
battlefields.  
The purpose of this research is to examine the feasibility, costs, and risks 
associated with current Marine Corps wired COC networking infrastructures, compared 
to implementing a new wireless network infrastructure. The analysis of information 
produced from this research will help Marine Corps Systems Command articulate the 
strengths, weaknesses, and cost impacts involved with choosing to implement a wireless 
network solution in the COC. This is important because it will give the Marine Corps 
Systems Command the information needed to help prioritize its acquisitions efforts and 
focus on projects that will allow the Marine Corps fleets to continue its competitive 
dominance in information superiority, despite decreasing resources due to budget 
constraints.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The problem is the Marine Corps fleet operating forces have identified a need for 
wireless capabilities in the Command Operations Center but have not been able to 
precisely articulate the feasibility, costs, and risks associated with implementing a 
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wireless network. This is a problem because current and projected budget constraints will 
possibly limit funding for communications equipment, redundant capabilities, and 
research and development of new alternatives for Command and Control. 
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT  
The purpose of this research is to examine the feasibility, costs, and risks 
associated with current Marine Corps COC networking infrastructures, compared to 
implementing a new wireless network infrastructure. The analysis of information 
produced from this research will help Marine Corps Systems Command articulate the 
strengths, weaknesses, requirements, and impacts on costs involved with choosing a new 
wireless networking infrastructure over the existing wired networking infrastructure. This 
is important because it will give the Marine Corps Systems Command the information it 
needs to help prioritize acquisitions efforts and focus decreasing resources (due to budget 
constraints), on projects that will allow the Marine Corps fleets to continue its 
competitive dominance in information superiority.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Coleman and Westcott’s (2012) Certified Wireless Network Administrator 
Official Study Guide is an excellent reference for this research paper because it 
concentrates on a wide range of essential topics that add to the understanding of wireless 
802.11 technology. It covers everything from the fundamentals to the employment of 
wireless technology. This reference will serve as a key-contributing factor in collecting 
literature to help build a discussion on important wireless and networking concepts.  
Dhawan (2007) examines Bluetooth, WiMAX, and Wi-Fi and examines how 
these technologies differ from one another. This information can then be presented in a 
table to allow for the Marine Corps Fleet Commander and acquisition specialists the 
ability to easily compare and contrast among the different wireless solutions.  
There are risks associated with operating a wireless network that differ and/or are 
not found with hardwired networks. Gast (2005) discusses some of these issues 
associated with deploying and maintaining wireless networks. For example, Gast (2005) 
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gives an extensive discussion on wireless security issues such as those occurring with the 
dynamic WEP standards and information on selecting security protocols. In order for the 
Marine Corps to implement a wireless network in today’s COC, where the operating 
environment is very dynamic and constantly faced with new emerging threats to 
information security, Gast’s discussion on identifying threats and prevention of these 
threats are important in articulating the strengths and weaknesses of wireless technology. 
Jindal, Jindal, and Gupta (2005) talk about the evolution of the wireless 
technology and on the different concepts, business models, and configurations of the 
different wireless communications types. This information can be used to help the 
researcher understand the subject without having to capture new data. Jindal et al. (2005) 
cover the benefit of WiMAX technology as “signals running close on wireless channels 
vice narrow lanes with the capability of utilizing more traffic with fewer disturbances. 
Many technologies currently available can only provide line of sight (LOS) coverage; the 
technology behind WI-MAX has been optimized to provide excelled non-line of sight 
(NLOS) coverage” (Jindal et al., 2005). The WI-MAX technology will be examined to 
see if it is a feasible solution for a Marine Corps COC. 
Currently, the Marine Corps is using the Capability Set (CapSet) Command 
Operation Centers from General Dynamics. A list of the key components of different 
CapSets can be analyzed to see if the pre-existing capabilities, such as the system’s server 
and router suite, can be modified to implement a wireless solution and at what cost. It 
also has pictures that will be helpful in depicting the bulkiness of some of the equipment 
and the containers they are carried in, which can give the reader a visual of the size and 
weight of some of this equipment in the COC. 
The Marine Corps Publication on Communications Information Systems, now 
known as The MAGTF Communications System MWCP 3–40.3, has important 
information on the doctrine, capabilities, techniques, and concepts behind employing 
communications resources in the Marine Corps operations. This literature is essential in 
understanding the needs and requirements of information systems in the Marine Corps 
and is the basis in accessing the viability and requirements of the current network 
architecture in order to access the feasibility of alternative wireless solutions. 
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Rappaport (2006) covers the fundamental issues that affect wireless networks and 
gives a review on the capabilities and weaknesses of wireless standards and technological 
developments in the field, such as 3G and Bluetooth technologies. Information on the 
different wireless technologies can be analyzed and compared to present 
recommendations to the commander to consider a type of wireless technology that can be 
used in a Command and Control Operations Center (COC). 
Ravichandiran and Vaithiyanathan (2009) give great templates for a table of a 
SWOT analysis on Wi-Fi, Wi-Fi mesh, and WiMAX technologies along with a 
comparison of all these wireless technologies. Their information on mesh and WiMAX 
technologies offer good background information that is included in this thesis paper in 
order to give the acquisitions personnel and/or communications planner a general 
understanding of the capabilities, employment, and benefits of these wireless 
technologies. 
Stallings (1998) discusses the risks associated with networking back in the 1990s 
that are still threats today. This understanding of Network Security is an important 
subject that needs to be covered in order to properly analyze wireless and hardwired 
network architectures. Planners, operators, and maintainers of Information Technology 
must be able to articulate the advantages and disadvantages of these types of IT to their 
customers. Stallings (1998) does not list costs in his discussion but talks about the type of 
technology needed such as cryptography algorithm software and other encryption-type 
software that will be helpful in increasing the knowledge of Marine Corps IT 
professionals and users.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
1. What are the strengths and weaknesses being added by introducing a 
wireless networking capability to Marine Corps COCs? 
2. What are the critical requirements that Marine Corps fleets desire to fulfill 
by adopting a wireless infrastructure over wired COC capabilities? 
3. What are the costs associated with acquiring a wireless capability in 
comparison to current capabilities and other available options? 
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4. How long and how well can the Marine Corps continue to operate with 
current COC capabilities, and what does it gain or lose by adapting a new 
wireless capability? 
F. RESEARCH METHODS 
The research for this thesis will be a qualitative study to explore and describe the 
benefits, issues, costs, and risk constraints for the Marine Corps to implement a wireless 
capability over its existing wired capability. The information and data collected will 
primarily come from previous research and studies of similar topics on the subject. Data 
will be captured by also researching other military agencies that currently use wireless 
communications in their command centers. All the information and data collected will be 
of an unclassified nature, and can be acquired from unclassified sources found in the 
library, acquisition documents, secondary research, and online. This research will not 
involve any lab work but may require travel if needed to interview other services’ 
communications personnel for interviews.  
G. PROPOSED DATA, OBSERVATION, AND ANALYSIS METHODS 
Statistical methods will be used in order to help summarize, describe, and 
compare collected data. Previous research and documents will be used to analyze and 
interpret the data to help articulate to the intended audience a better understanding of 
complex information if said audience is not familiar with the Information Sciences. 
H. POTENTIAL BENEFITS, LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
The potential benefit that may result from this thesis study is, to gain a better 
understanding of the problem area within the Marine Corps’ decision whether or not to 
adopt a new wireless technology or keep their current technology in the COC. This 
research will also give decision-makers the ability to articulate the feasibility of adopting 
wireless communications along with the weaknesses and risks associated with this 
technology. This research can also serve as an information source to help decision makers 
make informed decisions in their acquisition process. Limitations to this thesis study are 
due to time constraints on the researcher’s ability to collect data, prepare, and complete 
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this research. A recommendation for this thesis study is to use updated costs to produce a 
cost based analysis in order to compare advantages and disadvantages to adopting a 
wireless infrastructure or keeping the current wired infrastructure. 
I. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis report is organized into five chapters.  
Chapter I provide an introduction to the problem and purpose of this research and 
a discussion of the literature referenced in this research.  
Chapter II discusses the background and overview of wireless networking 
technology.  
Chapter III is a discussion of the current Marine Corps COC’s capabilities, 
guidance, and analysis of budget constraints that affect the Marine Corps acquisition and 
procurement ability.  
Chapter IV examines the economics and provides a SWOT and comparative 
analysis of current COC capabilities and wireless technology solutions available. 
Chapter V summarizes the information discussed in the previous chapters and 
concludes with recommendations.  
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II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF WIRELESS 
NETWORKING TECHNOLOGY 
A. BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general understanding of the 
background, fundamentals, standards and organizations, capabilities, and strengths and 
weaknesses of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 wireless to 
acquisitions and communications personnel and other key stakeholders involved with the 
decision-making in acquiring IT systems for the Marine Corps. IEEE 802.11 wireless is a 
standard for providing local area network (LAN) communications using radio frequencies 
(Coleman & Westcott, 2012).  
The concept of communicating by transferring information between two 
unconnected points is not new by any means. The United States Military first used 
communication using wireless technologies during World War II to relay battle plans 
back and forth between enemy and friendly lines (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). One of 
the first wireless networks developed was the ALOHAnet (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). 
The ALOHAnet used a wireless shared medium in the 400 MHZ frequency range to 
communicate between the Hawaiian Islands across a LAN communication Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) layer 2 protocols called ALOHA (Coleman & Westcott). The 
development of the ALOHAnet at the University of Hawaii in late 1960s and early 1970s 
provides historical insight into a range of wireless data network applications at the start of 
the 21st century (Schwartz & Abramson, 2009). It was not until the 1990s that 
commercial wireless networking vendors started making low-speed wireless data 
networking products, such as mobile phones, across the 900 MHz frequency band 
(Coleman & Westcott, 2012).  
In 1991, the IEEE began discussions for standardizing wireless local area network 
(WLAN) technologies, finally ratifying the original legacy 802.11 wireless network 
standards forming the building blocks for WLAN technology (Coleman & Westcott). 
When wireless technology was deployed to businesses and corporations between 1997 
and 1999, there was initial resistance before these entities, as well as home users, soon 
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began to realize the benefits and potential of having wireless networking (Coleman & 
Westcott, 2012). Today vendors such as Apple, which makes the iPhone and iPad, have 
helped revolutionize the IT world with their wireless data networking products. The 
demand for wireless technology has increased so drastically in the past five years that the 
market has now become saturated with wireless devices (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). 
Today, IEEE 802.11 wireless networks are more commonly referred to as Wi-Fi, 
the brand name created by the industry, and used to market WLAN technology (Coleman 
& Westcott, 2012). You can now find WLAN technology implemented and used in 
almost every home and office in the United States and other countries. Some common 
products that use this technology today are mobile phones, hand-held radios, laptops, 
computer peripherals, remote control cars, as well as thousands of other devices. The 
popularity and need for wireless networking solutions has increased as a result of the 
change in emphasis toward mobile systems and technology, which has become 
particularly popular and important to the younger and middle-age populations across the 
globe. Figure 1 shows a picture of a simple wireless networking architecture. 
 
Figure 1.  Wireless network picture (From Brain et al., 2013) 
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B.  WIRELESS FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE 
 Budget constraints and cutbacks are affecting the decisions of numerous 
organizations throughout the DoD. In 2010 Lieutenant General George Flynn, 
commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, stated that 
the Marine Corps needed to balance investments between current and future challenges 
(Jean, 2010). The difference in investment dollars well spent and lost can come down to 
the IT acquisitions personnel’s fundamental knowledge of wireless technologies when 
contracting with the right vendor to make the right product. Many bad contracts and 
obligations are made due to acquisitions officers not knowing what they are buying when 
it comes to IT. In order to make better decisions in the acquisition or non-acquisition of 
wireless technologies, it is important that the key stakeholders possess a fundamental 
knowledge and understanding of IEEE 802.11 wireless technology. This section is 
dedicated to building a basic understanding of some fundamental elements in wireless 
communications and technology. 
1. The OSI Model 
The cornerstone of data communications is the Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) model (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). The OSI model is a conceptual model 
developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in 1984 and is 
made up of seven layers as shown in Table 1 (Voelcker, 1986). Each layer utilizes the 









Layer 7 Application Http, SMTP,SNMP 
Layer 6 Presentation MIME, XDR 
Layer 5 Session SOCKS, TLS/SSL 
Layer 4 Transport TCP, UDP 
Layer 3 Network IP, Apple Talk 
Layer 2 Data – Link IEEE 802.2, 802.3 
Layer 1 Physical IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth 
Table 1.   OSI Model (After Coleman & Westcott, 2012) 
Layer 1, also known as the physical layer, is the lowest level of the OSI model 
and includes the functions needed to activate, maintain, and deactivate physical 
connections (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). This layer defines functional and procedural 
characteristics of the interface to the physical circuit (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). 
Voelcker (1986) states “the electrical and mechanical specifications are considered to be 
part of the medium itself.” An example of layer 1 technology is IEEE 802.3 standard for 
category 5 (CAT-5) Ethernet cable (Shirey, 2012).  
Layer 2, also known as the data – link layer, is responsible for the synchronization 
and error processing for information transmitted over the physical link (Coleman & 
Westcott, 2012).  
Layer 3, also known as the network layer, is responsible for routing 
communications through network resources to the system where the communicating 
application resides; fragment segmentation and reassembly of data packets and some 
error correction is done at this layer (Coleman & Westcott, 2012).  
Layer 4, also known as the transport layer, is responsible for the reliable end-to-
end transportation of data (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). It also includes functions like 
multiplexing multiple independent message streams over a single connection and 
segmenting data into appropriately sized units for the network layer (Coleman & 
Westcott, 2012).  
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Layer 5, also known as the session layer, the functions our analogous to the 
control language used to run a computer system (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). The 
session layer begins, manages, and terminates the session between a local and remote 
application (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). 
Layer 6, also known as the presentation layer, ensures that information delivered 
between two systems can understand each other by translating the communicating 
machines’ syntax if needed (Coleman & Westcott, 2012).  
Layer 7, the application layer, manipulates information in order to support 
distributed applications (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). This layer allows the user to 
interact directly with software applications and provides widest variety of work being 
done on the OSI layers (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Figure 2 depicts both the OSI 
model and IEEE 802.11 wireless. 
 
Figure 2.  OSI Model and 802.11 (From Wild Packets, n.d.) 
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IEEE 802.11 wireless technologies use layers 1 and 2 (Coleman & Westcott, 
2012). In a wired network infrastructure, radio frequency (RF) signals and data in binary 
form (1s and 0s) move across physical wires such as copper cables, CAT-5, and fiber 
optic cables (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Wireless network infrastructures are opposite, 
in that RF signals and data move through the atmosphere, hence the term “wireless” 
(Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Coleman and Westcott ask some important questions that 
acquisitions specialists and communications planners and installers should be aware of or 
provide general solutions that will mitigate the effects of risks when dealing with this 
technology.  
Why does a wireless network perform differently in an auditorium full of 
people than it does inside an empty auditorium? Why does the 
performance of a wireless LAN seems to degrade in a storage area with 
metal racks? Why does the range of a 5 GHz radio transmitter seem 
shorter than the range of a 2.4 GHz radio card? (Coleman & Westcott, 
2012) 
Answers to the aforementioned questions could prove to be vital to the decisions 
that acquisitions specialists and communications planners and users make when choosing 
the best qualified vendor that can provide the best wireless technology solution that fits 
within the organizations’ initial capabilities document (ICD), specifications, and fiscal 
constraints. It may also come in good use to that communications planner tasked with 
providing wireless communications services to multiple users either confined in close 
proximity and/or spread out across their operating environment.  
2. Radio Frequency Components and Operation 
The key components in the creation of a wireless medium are the transmitter, 
antenna, and receiver (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). When the computer sends the data to 
the transmitter, the transmitter then initiates the RF communication by generating an 
alternating current (AC) signal, determining the frequency of the transmission and then 
transporting the data directly to the antenna (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). The antenna 
collects the AC signal from the transmitter and then radiates or directs those RF waves 
away from the antenna to the receiver (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). The receiver takes 
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this signal, called the carrier signal, translates the signal into 1s and 0s, and then passes 
this data to the computer to be processed (Coleman & Westcott, 2012).  
3. Radio Frequency Signal Characteristics 
The electromagnetic spectrum is the range of self-propagating electromagnetic 
waves that have the ability to transverse across and through both matter and space 
(Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Antennas are used to radiate the RF electromagnetic signal 
away from it in a continuous pattern governed by radio frequency characteristics defined 
by the laws of physics, wavelength, frequency, amplitude, and phase (Coleman & 
Westcott, 2012). Coleman and Westcott (2012) define wavelength simply as the distance 
traveled by a single cycle of an RF signal. They describe frequency as “the number of 
times a specified event occurs within a specified time interval” (Coleman & Westcott, 
2012). Amplitude is the signal’s strength, “when speaking about wireless transmissions, 
this is often referenced as how loud or strong the signal is” (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). 
Finally the phase involves the relationship between two more signals when they share the 
same frequency (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). 
Coleman and Westcott (2012) state that  
It is very important to understand that there is an inverse relationship 
between wavelength and frequency. The three components of this inverse 
relationship are frequency (measured in hertz), wavelength (measured in 
meters), and speed of light. The larger the wavelength of an RF signal, the 
lower the frequency of that signal and the higher the frequency of an RF 
signal, the smaller the wavelength.  
4. How Radio Frequencies Behave 
RF signals move and behave in different manners when it travels either through 
wired mediums or wirelessly (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). The ways these signals move 
are known as wave propagation (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). The different types of RF 
wave propagation behaviors, which explain what happens to that signal as it moves from 
one location to the next, are absorption, reflection, scattering, refraction, diffraction, and 
multipath (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). It is important to understand these RF 
propagation behaviors because it will allow for better decision-making in the acquisition 
16 
of wireless products when examining equipment capabilities, as well as aid planners in 
the proper installation and employment of wireless technologies (Coleman & Westcott, 
2012). 
The first and most common type of RF wave propagation behavior to be 
discussed is absorption. Absorption occurs when a signal is absorbed or stopped by an 
object such as a large body of water, brick or concrete walls, along its path (Coleman & 
Westcott, 2012). Absorption is the leading and most common cause of decreased signal 
strength or amplitude, called signal attenuation or loss (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). The 
increase of signal strength is referred to as gain, or amplification. An example of 
absorption that occurs, which planners often neglect to consider, is when wireless access 
points (AP) are installed in large occupied conference rooms, the signal can be absorbed 
by the collection of water in the human body, which averages between 50 and 60 percent 
(Coleman & Westcott, 2012). As an added note, APs installed in large conference rooms 
may also experience effects of degraded signal strength because of lack of available 
bandwidth (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). 
When installing wireless APs, the planner should also be aware of the RF 
propagation behavior called reflection. Reflection occurs when the signal encounters an 
object that is bigger than the wave itself, and in turn is bounced off in another direction 
(Coleman & Westcott, 2012). The two major types of reflection are called sky wave 
reflection and microwave reflection (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Sky wave reflection 
occurs in frequencies below 1 GHZ that bounce off the surfaces of charged particles of 
the ionosphere (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). This is why you can be in Chicago, IL and 
still listen to radio stations in Los Angeles, CA (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Microwave 
reflection happens in higher frequencies between 1 GHz and 300 GHz. These signals 
have smaller wavelengths and can bounce off smaller objects such as glass, walls, and 
metal doors or bigger objects such as buildings, and even the earth’s own surface 
(Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Microwave reflection is often the issue with signal 
degradation and performance problems when operating in Wi-Fi environments (Coleman 
& Westcott, 2012). 
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Scattering happens when the electromagnetic signal’s wavelength is much larger 
than the object or pieces of the medium the signal reflected from causes the signal to be 
absorbed and then bounced or reflected into multiple directions (Coleman & Westcott, 
2012). An example of this scattering can happen during sandstorms or when the 
atmosphere is filled with smog (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Scattering can also occur 
when the RF signal encounters an uneven surface such as a chain link fence, tree foliage, 
or a rocky mountain, which causes the signal to scatter into multiple directions (Coleman 
& Westcott, 2012). This may be of concern if the wireless AP is placed in a secured 
space with fences or gates around it. This is a common physical security practice of units 
guarding communications suites or command posts. 
Refraction and diffraction are the two RF propagation conditions that exist where 
the RF signal is actually bent (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Not to be confused with each 
other, refraction occurs most commonly as a result of atmospheric conditions such as 
water vapor or changes in air temperature, causing the direction of the wave to change 
when the RF signal passes through a medium of a different density (Coleman & 
Westcott, 2012). Diffraction is the bending of the RF signal around the object or medium 
(Coleman & Westcott, 2012). An example of this condition happens when an object, such 
as a hill, partially blocks the origin of the signal and its intended destination (Coleman & 
Westcott, 2012). 
Multipath occurs when two or more paths of a signal arrive at the destination 
antenna the same time (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). This is a result of the previously 
discussed RF propagation behaviors that cause signals to reflect and bend which takes 
them longer to arrive at their destination and is called the delay spread (Coleman & 
Westcott, 2012). Multipath causes the combined signal to attenuate, amplify, or become 
corrupted (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Using directional antennas to reduce the number 
of reflections can mitigate the effects of multipath (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). 
5. RF Spectrum 
Burkhart (2004) believes that the Marine Corps and other DoD organizations’ 
over dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum for communications has caused for the 
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frequent encounters in potential competition, interference, and coordination requirements 
for international and commercial frequencies. Burkhart (2004) states that, “Over the past 
decade the Government has ceded 247 MHz of bandwidth to industry—more than half in 
the desirable 3 GHz band.” The military measures effectiveness of the spectrum in 
moving information from point to point as a matter of life and death (Burkhart, 2004). 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) encyclopedia defines the RF 
spectrum as the radio frequency portion of the electromagnetic spectrum (www.fcc.gov, 
2013). The FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) regulate the RF spectrum. The FCC manages the spectrum for non-Federal 
agencies and the Federal agencies are managed by the NTIA (www.fcc.gov, 2013). 
Figure 3 depicts the Wi-Fi Radio spectrum of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
 
Figure 3.  Wi-Fi Radio Spectrum and Services Chart  
(From U.S. Department of Commerce, 2003) 
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C. STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS 
There are numerous standards organizations and regulatory bodies that govern 
and regulate communications and the usage of wireless technology (Coleman & 
Westcott, 2012). It is important to become familiar with these different organizations and 
the roles and responsibilities they have with wireless communications to help develop 
awareness and increased understanding of the technology, because it is a field that 
constantly changes.  
In the United States, regulatory responsibility for setting the rules on the radio 
spectrum is divided between the Federal Communications Commission, which answers to 
Congress, and the International Telecommunication Union Radio Communication Sector 
(ITU-R), which answers to the executive branch of government (Burkhart, 2004). The 
ITU-R is a specialized United Nations agency that coordinates telecommunications 
matters among member countries. Use of the radio spectrum is largely coordinated 
through the ITU-R radio communications sector, which develops technical coordination 
criteria and standards for such use, and through various periodic conferences attended by 
member nations of the ITU-R (Burkhart, 2004).  
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has a collaboration of 
well-respected people in the computer industry, and creates the standards for 
compatibility and interoperability between networking systems all while adhering to the 
rules of its oversight organizations, such as the FCC (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). Then 
there are nonprofit industries such as the global Wi-Fi Alliance that market and raise 
consumer awareness to new wireless technologies as they are introduced (Coleman & 
Westcott, 2012). Another important organization is the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), a global, nongovernmental organization that partners and develops 
standards for business, government, and consumers’ needs (Coleman & Westcott, 2012). 
Acquisitions and communications personnel working in the information technology field 
should stay abreast of the latest technology and news. 
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D. TYPES OF WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES 
This chapter is dedicated to a discussion of the different Wi-Fi technologies that 
are available in the commercial and military sectors today. Knowing the different 
technologies available will help with the understanding and ability to articulate the 
capabilities for the acquisitions and/or communications personnel responsible for 
acquiring, implementing, planning, and employing these devices. Below is a 
summarization of the current available wireless technologies.  
1. EEE 802.11a 
Brain, Wilson, and Johnson (n.d.), state, “IEEE 802.11a transmits at 5 GHz and 
can move up to 54 megabits of data per second.” It uses orthogonal frequency-division 
multiplexing (OFDM), which is a coding technique that splits the radio signal into several 
sub signals before it reaches the receiver, a process that greatly reduces interference 
(Brain et al., n.d.). 
2. IEEE 802.11b 
IEEE 802.11b is probably one of the cheapest and slowest standards available 
(Brain et al., n.d.), and uses complementary code keying (CCK) modulation and transmits 
in the 2.4 GHz frequency band transferring up to 11 megabits of data per second (Brain et 
al., n.d.). 
3. IEEE 802.11g 
Like IEEE 802.11a, IEEE 802.11g use OFDM coding techniques but shares the 
2.4 GHz frequency band of the radio spectrum like 802.11b (Brain et al., n.d.). Although 
IEEE 802.11g and IEEE 802.11b transmit in similar frequency bands, IEEE 802.11g is  
faster than IEEE 802.11b and can handle speeds up to 54 megabits per second (Brain et 
al., n.d.) 
4. IEEE 802.11n 
IEEE 802.11n has become one of the most exciting and widely available 
standards (Brain et. al., n.d.). It uses the APs and clients’ antennas to transmit multiple 
21 
and simultaneous data streams (White Paper, n.d.). The resulting effect is both increased 
throughput and increased range (White Paper, n.d.). IEEE 802.11n can transmit up to 140 
megabits per second (Brain et. al., n.d.) and 802.11n is backwards compatible with IEEE 
802.11a,b, and g standards (Brain et. al., n.d.). 
5. IEEE 802.11ac  
A newer standard currently in draft form at the IEEE (but you may be able to find 
products for on the market), is IEEE 802.11ac (Brain et. al., n.d.). IEEE 802.11ac is 
backwards compatible with IEEE 802.11a, b, g, and n standards and transmits at either 
2.4GHz or 5GHz frequency bands (Brain et. al., n.d.). IEEE 802.11ac is stated to be the 
fastest of the Wi-Fi standards with the ability to handle a maximum of 450 megabits per 
second on each of its multiple streams (Brain et. al., n.d.). 
6. IEEE 802.16 
IEEE 802.16, also referred to as the Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave 
Access (Wi-MAX), is a wireless technology based on a point-to-point broadband wireless 
access that uses microwaves to transfer data over distances over several kilometers 
(Jindal et al., 2004). Wi-MAX is based on the IEEE 802.16 wide area communications 
standards and has data rates that can reach up to 75Mb/s and has devices that works in the 
signals ranging anywhere from 2 GHz to 66 GHz (Mitchell, 2013). 
7. Bluetooth 
Dhawan (2007) defined Bluetooth as a wireless technology where all mobile 
devices are connected in range of one mobile device. It was created to be used in mobile 
devices like laptops, cell phones, and LANs, but can now be found in other devices such 
as cars, video games, headsets, and other commercial electronic devices. Bluetooth 
technology was invented by Ericsson in 1994 and worked using the 2.4 to 2.48 GHz radio 
frequency spectrums (Palmer, 2012).  
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8. Wave Relay 
Wave Relay is an advanced mobile ad hoc networking (MANET) solution that 
goes beyond the standard “self-forming” and “self-healing” mesh network and was 
developed by Persistent Systems. Instead, Wave Relay quickly and continuously adapts to 
fluctuations in terrain and other difficult environmental conditions to maximize 
connectivity and communication performance (www.persistentsystems.com, n.d.). The 
Wave Relay proprietary routing algorithm allows users to incorporate vast numbers of 
meshed devices into the network in which the devices themselves form the 
communication infrastructure (www.persistentsystems.com, n.d.) Figure 4 is an 




Figure 4.  Wave Relay Architecture (After www.persistent.com, 2013) 
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E. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 
Dhawan (2007) discussed how increasing demand for mobile devices and the 
flexibility and mobility of the wireless technology have fueled the push for organizations 
to implement wireless technologies. In this chapter, the benefits and risks of adopting or 
implementing a wireless communications solution in an organization such as the Marine 
Corps will be discussed. The Marine Corps’ vision of a wireless solution is one that 
provides a common, scalable, and interoperable solution from the company level up to 
the MAGTF level. This solution should not only save money and make logical sense, but 
it should also enhance the ability to Command and Control.  
1. Benefits of Wireless Solutions 
The answer to the question of the feasibility of wireless technology in a Marine 
Corps COC from a technological argument is yes. Wireless devices can be installed in a 
Marine Corps COC as easily as a home local area network. There are other issues that 
will be discussed later that prevents this technology from being implemented into the 
COC such as compatibility, costs, and regulations that dictate the implementation of this 
technology into existing systems, that will be covered later on in this chapter. This 
section will focus specifically on the applications such as data, voice, and video that have 
benefited with the expansion, availability, and technology improvements to the wireless 
networking infrastructure (Coleman & Westcott, 2012).  
A benefit of wireless technology and communications is the increased mobility it 
offers. No longer is the user bound to a cable medium. A common misconception 
discussed by O’Sullivan (2001), is that wireless and mobility are synonymous. O’Sullivan 
(2001) states that they’re different because wireless addresses media access sharing 
issues whereas mobility is about routing and addressing issues. Although it is possible to  
have mobility without wireless technologies, the always-connected network organization 
the Marine Corps and other DoD entities have adopted benefits substantially from 
wireless technologies (O’Sullivan, 2001).  
Another benefit of wireless technology is the increase in speed with both 
installation and uninstallation of a network of many users (O’Sullivan, 2001). An 
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organization gains valuable time in establishing their networks and tearing them down 
because of the absence of wire needing to be ran during installation and recovered during 
uninstallation (O’Sullivan, 2001). 
Another advantage of wireless technology is it allows for increased flexibility and 
scalability of an organizations’ network (O’Sullivan, 2001). A wireless network can 
instantaneously be scaled to allow for a sudden increase in users as long as the users are 
in line of sight of the AP. Multiple APs allows for increased distances where non-
collocated users can also connect to the wireless network. 
2. The Risks of Wireless 
Albert, Garstka, and Stein’s (2009) Network Centric Warfare states that “Risk 
translates directly into increased costs and/or reduced value. Hence, the reduction of risk 
and its proper management are an inherent part of value creation. Network Security 
professionals such as John Fulp refer to risk in networking using a Risk Equation. The 
Risk Equation is written as “Risk = Threats x Vulnerabilities x Impact/ Security 
Controls” (J.D. Fulp, lecture, August 12, 2013).  
So what are risks? Risks have the potential to disrupt or deny wireless 
communications. A lower risk value is more acceptable than a higher value. Threats are 
the identified or perceived issues that have been found to inflict harm to the intended 
operation of a wireless technology. The major cyber threats are security concerns. 
Vulnerabilities are the attributes of wirelesses design that results in intentional and/or 
unintentional problems (J. D. Fulp, lecture, August 12, 2013). An impact refers to the 
amount or type of damage that will be inflicted in correlation to a threat if it is 
unaddressed. When looking at impacts it is important to use the lens of the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) triad as it relates to costs, information 
assurance (IA), and mission-readiness (J. D. Fulp, lecture, August 12, 2013). The CIA 
triad will be discussed more in detail in the paragraph on security concerns and threats. 
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3. Security Concerns and Threats 
Due to the expanded ability to deploy wireless technologies and applications into 
areas previously thought as inaccessible have created a myriad of security concerns as 
well. J.D. Fulp (2013) uses the term “CIA triad” to describe the three core information 
security objectives (lecture, August 12, 2013). Fulp states “Confidentiality is defined as 
the assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, processes, or 
devices. Integrity: guarding against improper information modification, and includes 
ensuring information authenticity. Availability: timely, reliable access to data and 
information services for authorized users” (lecture, August 12, 2013). 
a. Types of Attacks 
An attack is a threat that is carried out against a vulnerability that may 
exist in a wired or wireless network (Stallings et al., 2008). According to Coleman and 
Diener (2007), attacks are either intentional or unintentional. Intentional attacks are those 
that (as the name states) are done intentionally by a perpetrator with the intent to disrupt 
Wi-Fi communications through jammers, hacking and other malicious computer activity 
(Coleman & Diener, 2007). “This type of attack can both cause denial of service (DoS), 
and breaches that provide illicit access to the network” (Coleman & Diener, 2007). 
Unintentional attacks come from common devices that share the unlicensed spectrum 
with Wi-Fi, such as cordless phones and Bluetooth devices. Even devices not used for 
communication, such as microwave ovens; transmit RF in this spectrum, potentially 
disrupting Wi-Fi communications. “This type of RF interference can cause Wi-Fi users to 
experience degradation of throughput, increased latency, and loss of connectivity” 
(Coleman & Diener, 2007).  
Rogue Access Points. Major oversights in most current wireless intrusion 
detection systems (WIDS) solutions are the inability to identify security threats at layer 1, 
the physical layer of the OSI model (Coleman & Diener, 2007). One major layer 1 
security risk is undetectable rogue access points. Rogue access points are 802.11 devices 
that are connected by some malicious person to an 802.3 Ethernet port giving him a 
portal and access to attack from within your network infrastructure (Coleman & Diener, 
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2007). Examples of these rogue devices are the Bluetooth radios found inside some 
laptop computers, which allow them to plug into your router through the Ethernet port. A 
layer 2 WIDS or wireless Internet protection system (WIPS) are recommended solutions 
in order to detect and prevent the effects of these rogue devices (Coleman & Diener, 
2007). 
Denial of Service Attacks. According to Fulp, Denial of Service Attacks 
(DoS) is another threat to Wi-Fi security, in which the attacker attempts to disable your 
network by overworking your networks bandwidth, processor, and/or memory (lecture, 
August 12, 2013). These types of attacks are most common at layer 2 as well as at layer 
1, and are considered to be serious threats toward mission critical tasks because it has the 
capability to compromise the availability of your systems and network (Coleman & 
Diener, 2007). An example of a DoS attack is the jamming effect by an electronic counter 
measure (ECM) device preventing the operation of radio and cell phone used to detonate 
improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq. These were layer 1 devices that intentionally 
or unintentionally denied service to any device operating within a specific spectrum by 
producing more power than the other devices using that spectrum. DoS attacks at the 
Layer 2 level, however, can be difficult to prevent but are easy to detect with WIDS 
devices and software (Coleman & Diener, 2007). The most common DoS attacks come 
from unintentional interference from devices such as microwaves and other devices 
operating on the same frequency as your wireless network. 
Authentication Attacks. The request for comments (RFC) 2828 document 
states that authentication attacks occur when an attacker compromises the authentication 
process in order to gain access into the wired or wireless network (Shirey, 2000). RFC 
2828 states that the authentication process consists of identification step, providing a 
approved user identification name, and then a verification step, providing a password to 
verify you are that user (Shirey, 2000). Most authentication attacks are against 
vulnerabilities in passwords. Today many organizations as well as the Marine Corps have 
adopted and implemented Information Assurance (IA) programs where the focus is 
training on areas such as password protection and password generation procedures and 
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practices in order to help prevent against dictionary attacks and other password hijacking 
techniques.  
Evil Twin Access Points. Evil Twin Access Points refers to attacks in 
which Wi-Fi users are tricked into connecting to a pretentious wireless AP Phifer (2011). 
“Also known as AP Phishing, Wi-Fi Phishing, Hot spotter, or Honeypot AP, these attacks 
use phony APs with fake log-in pages to capture credentials and credit card numbers, 
launch man-in-the-middle attacks, or infect wireless hosts” (Phifer, 2011). There is WIDS 
software available that helps detect these types of attacks, for example Internet Browsers 
such as Microsoft Internet Explorer and Firefox have implemented security padlocks to 
indicate that a website is authentic and secure. 
Man-in-the-Middle. RFC 2828 defines the Man-in-the-Middle attacks as 
when an attacker intercepts and modifies data that was communicated between two 
parties and then pretends to be one of the intended recipients or the sender (RFC 2828).  
Eavesdropping. Eavesdropping is when wiretapping is done passively and 
secretly in order to intercept information from two communicating parties (RFC 2828).  
4. Vulnerabilities and Limitations of Wireless Networks 
Rappaport (2006) discussed some of the limitations and vulnerabilities in wireless 
networking compared with fixed wired networks (p. 443). A problem unique to wireless 
communications that Rappaport (2006) discussed was the hostile and random nature of 
the radio channel, and since users may request services from many different locations 
while traversing over wide areas, APs must be in place that can seamlessly handle this 
possible constant change of location while keeping the user connected (Rappaport, 2006, 
p. 444). Historically, and the argument is it still holds true today, the user requirements 
for wireless communications has exceeded the capacity of the available technology and 
resources such as routers and APs (p. 443). Because of the proliferation of wireless 
networks in homes and workplaces, people have become familiar with the technology, as 
a result demand along with high expectations of quality of service have increased to a 
point that may or may not be supplied by the provider.  
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S. Jindal et al., (2004) described vulnerabilities inherent with two wireless 
technologies, 802.11b and 802.11g, in that it uses the crowded 2.4 GHz spectrums. A 2.4 
GHz spectrum is the spectrum also used for common devices such as microwave ovens, 
cell phones, cordless phones, and Bluetooth-enabled devices (Jindal et al., 2004). Similar 
devices on a network that share the 2.4 GHz spectrums have the potential to cause 
degradation in the performance of your wireless network (Jindal et al., 2004). Jindal et al. 
(2004) also discussed the issue of power consumption as a key vulnerability because 
802.11b/g standard power consumption is fairly high compared to other standards, 
causing battery life and overheating to be of concern. 
5. Impacts  
Impacts of wireless technology for a military institution can be examined through 
several lenses such as cost, operation, information assurance, and loss of life or critical 
resources. Managing costs is critical considering today’s financial climate, where budgets 
are decreasing and spending is being more scrutinized. Operations can be either 
positively or negatively impacted significantly by wireless technology, especially if a 
unit’s wireless communications infrastructure is its single point of failure. Information 
assurance has been given a lot of attention as of late in the Marine Corps and DoD as a 
whole due to the increased availability and usage of wireless and similar technologies. If 
wireless technology can increase effectiveness and efficiencies of an organization’s C2, 
then lives and other valuable resources can be positively affected. 
6. Security Controls  
When discussing risks such as the threats, issues, and problems associated with 
Wi-Fi technology as above, it is also appropriate to provide a possible solution and/or 
way to mitigate the threat. One such solution that mitigates the threat to information 
assurance is practicing good information awareness and providing information assurance 
training. One can read and/or PDF files of current and draft Federal government security 
policies, regulations, and publications on the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology’s Security Division website www.csrc.nist.gov. 
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III. DISCUSSION OF THE CURRENT MARINE CORPS COC 
A. BACKGROUND 
In 2012, the Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) put out a 
document soliciting thesis research on the topic of providing acquisitions personnel with 
information that would help them better articulate the benefits of a wireless 
communications solution within a Marine Corps COC. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide a summarization of different wired and wireless communications and networking 
equipment, mediums, standards, and regulations currently in place throughout the 
command echelons in the Marine Corps. This will provide the acquisitions and 
communications personnel with general background and understanding of the current 
capabilities, standards and regulations, and equipment, enabling them to better articulate 
and/or reference the subject of both wired and wireless communications that are currently 
employed throughout the Marine Corps. The chapter begins by covering the Marine 
Corps current guidance and standards on the operation of wireless network clients on a 
Marine Corps network. The second section of this chapter is dedicated to the current 
Marine Corps communications network and Combat Operations Center (COC) CapSet 
solution employed by different echelons of the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF).  
B. USMC GUIDANCE ON WIRELESS NETWORKS AND DEVICES 
In July 2007, the Marine Corps Command, Control, Communications, and 
Computers (C4) Information Assurance Division published the Marine Corps 
Information Assurance Enterprise Directive (IAED): 014 Wireless Local Area Networks 
(WLANs) V2.0 Directive. The document’s purpose was to provide instructions governing 
DoD Information Assurance (IA) and outline the security configuration and 
implementation standards for WLANs in the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) 
(Marine Corps IAED 014 WLANs v2.0, 2007). The Marine Corps IAED (2007) 
objectives were to ensure that the Marine Corps:  
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 Protect the confidentiality, availability, authentication, integrity, and non-
repudiation of both wired and wireless IT assets, including information 
transmitted using commercial WLAN wireless devices, services and 
technologies 
 Wireless IT assets do not adversely impact existing systems by causing 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) or other unintended electromagnetic 
consequences as determined by the FIPS 140–1, Security Requirements 
for Cryptographic Modules, 25 May ‘01 
 Wireless technologies are afforded the safeguards required to protect 
USMC IT assets from the vulnerabilities associated with the use of 
commercial wireless local area networking technologies 
 Personnel using USMC information systems receive wireless security 
training commensurate with their duties and responsibilities 
 Wireless security-related technology research and development efforts are 
responsive to the requirements of the USMC 
 Encourages interoperability between Department of the Navy (DON) 
enclaves and DoD agencies, as required 
 
The Marine Corps IAED (2007) applies to all Marine Corps components, 
organizations, and personnel including systems directly connected to the Marine Corps 
Enterprise Network (MCEN) backbone and any other networks used to process both 
standalone and contractor-provided USMC data. The MCEN backbone is defined as “all 
garrison, tactical and Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) networks that operate in 
accordance with the Marine Corps IAED 014 WLANs v2.0 (2007) section 1.3.1.” The 
IAED (2007) also classifies the use of commercial wireless networking technologies into 
two zones as well as list those devices and systems that do not apply to the IAED are 







Zone 1 Zone 2 Devices that Do Not Apply
All wireless networks using 
commercial wireless 
technologies, that connect to the 
MCEN backbone, and/or stores, 
processes, or displays USMC 
operational data, processes any 
information that is sensitive in 
nature or any other information 
that may be considered DoD 
SBU. 
All wireless networks using 
commercial technologies, which 
do not fit into Zone 1, such as 
dedicated point-to-point RF 
connections secured by a FIPS 
140 approved solution that 
operates at or above Layer 3 of 
the OSI model, or an 
infrastructure solution secured by 
the Harris Sec Net 54 Type 1 
solution.
Receive only pagers, GPS 
receivers, hearing aids, 
pacemakers, Blue tooth devices 
(mice, keyboards, printers and 
other peripheral devices), Radio 
Frequency Identification Device 
(RFID) technology 
Table 2.   IAED Zones and devices that do not apply (After IAED, 2007). 
According to the IAED (2007) cellular wireless technologies are allowed to 
connect to the MCEN as long as they are secured in accordance with current publications 
of the remote access service (RAS) policy and have the necessary data encryption 
technology approved by the DAA security solution. The IAED (2007) states that the 
“current policy does not support using a wireless client on any non-USMC approved 
wireless network to access a government/military network.” An example of this would be 
using your wireless client or device to access the MCEN from a hotel or airport wireless 
network hotspot (IAED, 2007). 
C. DOD GUIDANCE ON USE OF COMMERCIAL WLAN DEVICES 
The purpose of DoDD (DoD Directive) 8100.2 (2007) is to “establish policy and 
assign responsibility for the use of commercial wireless devices, services, and 
technologies in the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG).” It is important for acquisitions 
personnel and communications planners to understand these references before purchasing 
and employing wireless technologies in their networks. 
DoDD 8100.2 policy states that: 
4.1. Wireless devices, services, and technologies that are integrated or 
connected to DoD networks are considered part of those networks, and 
must comply with DoD Directive 8500.01E and DoD Instruction 8500.02 
and be certified and accredited in accordance with DoD Instruction 
5200.40. 
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4.2. Cellular/PCS and/or other RF or Infrared (IR) wireless devices shall 
not be allowed into an area where classified information is discussed or 
processed without written approval from the DAA in consultation with the 
Cognizant Security Authority (CSA) Certified TEMPEST Technical 
Authority (CTTA). 
4.3. Wireless technologies/devices used for storing, processing, and/or 
transmitting information shall not be operated in areas where classified 
information is electronically stored, processed, or transmitted unless 
approved by the DAA in consultation with the CSA CTTA. The 
responsible CTTA shall evaluate the equipment using risk management 
principles and determine the appropriate minimum separation distances 
and countermeasures. 
4.4. Pursuant to subparagraph 4.1.2, DAAs shall ensure that Wireless 
Personal Area Network (WPAN) capability is removed or physically 
disabled from a device unless FIPS PUB140–2-validated cryptographic 
modules are implemented (reference (g)). Exceptions may be granted on a 
case-by-case basis as determined by the DAA. 
4.5. The DoD Components shall actively screen for wireless devices. 
Active electromagnetic sensing at the DoD or contractor premises to 
detect/prevent unauthorized access of DoD ISs shall be periodically 
performed by the cognizant DAA or Defense Security Service office to 
ensure compliance with the DoD Information Technology Security 
Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) ongoing accreditation 
agreement. 
4.6. Mobile code shall not be downloaded from non-DoD sources. 
Downloading of mobile code shall only be allowed from trusted DoD 
sources over assured channels. 
4.7. PEDs that are connected directly to a DoD-wired network (e.g., via a 
hot synch connection to a workstation) shall not be permitted to operate 
wirelessly while directly connected. 
4.8. Anti-virus software shall be used on wireless-capable PEDs and 
workstations that are used to synchronize/transmit data, in accordance 
with reference (e). The network infrastructure shall update anti-virus 
software for all applicable PEDs and their supporting desktops from a site 
maintained by the Defense Information Systems Agency. 
4.9. The DoD Components shall seek and follow spectrum supportability 
guidance from the Military Communications-Electronics Board (MCEB) 
prior to assuming any contractual obligations for the full-scale 
development, production, procurement, or deployment of spectrum 
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dependent (i.e., wireless) devices or systems, in accordance with DoD 
Directive 4650.01. 
4.10. A DoD wireless KM process shall be established. The goal is 
increased sharing of DoD wireless expertise to include information on 
vulnerability assessments, best practices, and procedures for wireless 
device configurations and connections. 
The use of commercial WLAN devices, systems, and technologies in the DoD 
GIG (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007) is discussed in the above memorandum from 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Network and Information Integration department. The 
policy provides supplemental guidance to DoDD 8100.2, with the goal of enhancing 
overall security and creating a roadmap for interoperability that embraces the IEEE 
standards for wireless or cellular technologies (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007). The 
policy states “WLAN devices, systems, and technologies must be acquired, configured, 
operated, and maintained to ensure joint interoperability, open standards, and open 
architectures per DoD Directive 8100.2 and DoD Instruction 8551.1 (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2007). Any new acquisition of WLAN devices, systems, and technologies must 
comply with IEEE 802.11 body of standards (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007). 
D. CURRENT USMC COC SOLUTIONS 
Lawlor (2004) reported that in 2002, General Dynamics Decision Systems located 
in Scottsdale, Arizona, was awarded a five-year contract worth $13.4 million to develop 
the current Marine Corps COC CapSets. The Combat Operations Center (COC), 
originally known as the unit operations center (UOC) when it first came out, is designed 
to provide centralized Command and Control operational facilities to collect, process, and 
disseminate tactical data for the commander and staff of a Marine battalion/squadron. 
The COC CapSets was a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution to fill a mobile C2 
capability gap for the Marine Corps MAGTFs. The Marine Corps Components tock 
document for the COC provides the following technical data description:  
The COC is a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 
trailer-based system that provides tactical commanders with a Common 
Operational Picture (COP) and integrated tactical data and 
communications assets needed to plan and conduct operations in an 
expeditionary combat environment. The system enables analytical and 
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intuitive decision-making with a modular and scalable equipment set 
consisting of a common module Operational Facility (OPFAC), C2 
system, visual displays, and software. 
Manufactured by General Dynamics Decisions Systems, the Marine Corps COC 
CapSets currently come in four variations: CapSet I, designed for the Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF) level echelons; CapSet II, designed for the Marine 
Subordinate Command (MSC) level echelons; CapSet III, designed for the regimental, 
Marine Wing Squadrons (MWSG), Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) level echelons; 
and CapSet IV, designed for the Battalion, Marine Air Group (MAG), and Marine Wing 
Support Squadrons (MWSS) level echelon (Lawlor, 2004). All CapSets come with a 
standard basic package, which includes laptops and tables, tents, a mobile 
communications trailer, and a mobile generator. All CapSets are hardwired with Ethernet 
cables that connect the end user devices to a switch/router combo found in the 
communications trailer.  
The differences between the CapSets are usually based on the equipment and 
tactical data systems (TDS) capability found in each CapSet based on the level of the 




Figure 5.  COC CapSet III (From USMC, 2005) 
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Description and Function. The Combat Operations Center (COC), 
Tactical Command System, AN/TSQ-XXX (V) 3 is a set of Commercial-
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment configured as a Capability Set III 
(CapSet III) tailored to the Regiment/Group level and is designed to 
provide a self-contained Command and Control (CÇ) operational facility 
to collect, process, and disseminate tactical data for the Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander and staff. The illustrations 
depict a CapSet III AN/TSQ-XXX (V) 3 deployed for operation and 
stowed ready for movement. COC displacement relies on three (3) owning 
unit M1123 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)-
A2s as the prime mover. Up to 24 owning unit provided external radios 
may be connected to the COC voice communication system. Antennas can 
be located up to 2 km away using supplied fiber optic cable. (USMC, 
2005) 
 
Figure 6.  COC CapSet IV (From USMC, 2005) 
Description and Function. The Combat Operations Center (COC), 
Tactical Command System, AN/TSQ-XXX (V) 4 is Commercial-Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) equipment configured as a Capability Set IV (CapSet IV) 
tailored to the Battalion/Squadron level. It provides a self-contained 
Command and Control (CÇ) operational facility to collect, process, and 
disseminate tactical data for the CE, GCE, CSSE, and ACE commanders 
and their staff. The picture depicts a CapSet IV deployed for operation. 
CapSet IV COC displacement relies on two (2) owning unit M1123 High 
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)-A2s as the prime 
movers. Up to 24 external radios may be connected using the two Digital 
Switching Units (DSU); antennas can be located up to 2 km away using 
fiber optic cable. (USMC, 2005) 
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E. USMC IT BUDGET ANALYSIS 
The Department of Defense has been faced with a multitude of budget cuts across 
the board. Marine Corps Times staff writer Tilghman (2013) writes in a news briefing on 
31 July 2013 that Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel outlined the blunt choices that the 
DoD are facing under the current sequestration where all military services are forced to 
take a 10 percent cut across the board. Tilghman (2013) goes on to discuss that Hagel 
outlined the conclusions of the strategic review where he discussed what the trade-offs 
will have to be between the capacity and the capability of our military forces. The Office 
of Management and Budget’s (OMB) document offers a proposed fiscal year 
2014 budget for the DoD of $526.6 billion (Internet source: www.budget.gov). This is a 
$3.9 billion or a 0.7 percent decrease from the 2012 budget (Internet source: 
www.budget.gov). Ten percent cuts across the board and a 7 percent decrease in financial 
budgets pose a significant concern and constraint to the Marine Corps, which in 2012 
made up only 8 percent of the budget. Figure 5 is snapshot of the summary of the 






Figure 7.  DON FY 2014 Budget Overview (Office of the Secretary of the Navy  
Financial Management and Comptroller, 2013)  
Organizations such as the DON and USMC are reducing their IT infrastructure 
costs and cyber vulnerabilities by consolidating Enterprise IT contracts, data centers, and 
improving IT governance (Office of the Secretary of the Navy Financial Management 
and Comptroller, 2013). In the midst of the current and projected fiscal challenges along 
with a minute representation of the DoD’s fiscal budget, the Marine Corps must be able 
to maintain both capacity and capability while continuing to modernize its IT capabilities. 
According to McFarland in the Marine Air Ground Task Force’s fiscal year 2012 C2 
Roadmap PowerPoint brief, the Marine Corps’ goals are to reduce the structure of the 
Marine Corps, modernizing and reshaping it into a “middleweight force” able to meet the 
uncertainty and threats of a strained fiscal environment, budget cuts, and current 
challenges and challengers to our nation’s security. As a result, critical decisions have to 
be made now and in the future regarding the procurement of new IT systems as well what 
to do with our legacy IT systems with the availability of what financial resources can 
buy. Figure 6 provides a snapshot taken from the DON’s 2014 budget highlights Figure 
5, which shows fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014 appropriations summary. 
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Figure 8.  DON 2014 Appropriations Summary (2013). 
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1. Current Marine Corps IT Procurement and R&D Programs  
The next section talks about some of the Marine Corps’ current research and 
development programs and acquisitions in IT.  
a. Marine Corps Command and Control Modernization:  
The Department of the Navy’s FY 2014 Budget Highlights (2013) notes 
that in order to improve the command and control capability for the MAGTF, the Marine 
Corps is seeking to use fiscal year 2014 budget funds for the procurement and research 
and development of three Command and Control systems (NOTM, JBC-P, and CAC2S). 
The U.S. Department of the Navy’s Contract (2012) reads that in 2013 the Marine Corps 
awarded iGov Technologies, Inc., in Reston, VA, a “$64,637,423 firm-fixed-price 
contract to modernize the existing hardware within the Marine Corps’ Combat 
Operations Center (COC).” The U.S. DON Contract (2012) also discusses that this effort 
will update and modernize the COC to a single baseline while reducing size weight and 
power requirements, replacing routers and servers, etc. The U.S. DON Contract (2012) 
reads that this contract contains options, which if exercised, would bring the total contract 
value to $96,907,500 and that the Marine Corps System Command located in Quantico, 
VA, is the contracting activity (M67854–12-C-2429). 
b. Marine Corps Radio and Switching Modernization:  
In fiscal year 2014, the Marine Corps is looking to continue to procure 
tactical radio systems with the capability to support operational voice and data 
communications and other C2 requirements for static or mobile Marine units (Office of 
the Secretary of the Navy Financial Management and Comptroller, 2013). The 2014 
budget also “allow the Marine Corps to continue to upgrade vehicular multi-channel 
radio systems with hardware and software that will increase bandwidth, reliability, and 
security for tactical command and control users” (Office of the Secretary of the Navy 
Financial Management and 2013). Furthermore, the Marine Corps will continue its 
procurement of Maintainer Training Systems for the Data Distribution System Modular 
(DDS-M), which provides LAN/WAN capabilities and makes up the MAGTF’s data 
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communication backbone (Office of the Secretary of the Navy Financial Management 
and Comptroller , 2013). 
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IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF USMC EXISTING WIRED COC 
VS. WIRELESS  
A. SWOT ANALYSIS WIRELESS VS WIRED COC 
1. Wired COC 
This section will analyze the Marine Corps CapSet model’s strengths, weakness, 
opportunities, and threats. The analysis is based on the wired architecture of these COC 
systems.  
a. Strengths  
The strength of the current COC is all of its equipment is hard-wired and 
readily compatible with everything within the COC CapSets. The desks and tables of all 
the CapSets are all pre-wired with CAT-5 cable. This eliminates the messy runs of CAT-
5 cable from the communication trailer’s switches to the users’ laptops, computers, and 
other network devices. COC users’ devices are hard-wired, which also offers them the 
benefit of a reliable connection to the network and a network where services, as well as 
the devices, can easily be deployed, administered, monitored, and controlled by the 
managers of that network in any environment.  
Another strength of the wired connection in the CapSets is its ability to 
transfer, download, and upload huge files and data across the network. Files such as 
Power Points and PDFs have the potential to be very large which can be problematic for 
some standards of wireless 802.11 technologies. 
An additional strength of the COC’s wired connection is the argument that 
hardwired technologies physically more secure than wireless. The idea rests behind the 
belief of current best security practices of most COC’s, such as access restriction to 
spaces and physical barriers, an adversary wishing to commit certain denial of service 
(i.e., jamming), modification, and eavesdropping attacks on a network, ability would be 
physically hampered.  
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b. Weakness  
A weakness of the current COC is the lack of (or limitations on) mobility 
because of its wired architecture. Although being wired has its strengths and benefits, it 
hampers the users’ as well as the network administrators’ and installers’ flexibility to 
move and/or locate devices within or away from the COC without the installation of 
additional wiring outside of the COC CapSets pre-wired architecture. Figure 5 is an 




Figure 9.  Wired CapSet (www.docstoc.com, n.d.) 
“Moore’s law” describes the principle dynamic of innovation in the 
semiconductor fabrication market (Albert, 2000). The idea is that the performance of 
computer technology can be expected to double approximately every 18 months (Albert, 
2000). The current computer technology in the COC at the time of this writing is nearly 
ten years old. Following Moore’s law, that means the current technology of the COC 
CapSets are quite outdated. Although firmware updates can extend the life of the 
software of a system, the system is still limited by its hardware, memory and processing 
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speed. The outdated nature of these systems can also create reliability problems as well as 
compatibility issues with newer equipment and newer technologies.  
Another weakness of the wired architecture of the COC is the bulkiness of 
the entire system and accountability of thousands of pieces associated with the system. 
The setting up, tearing down, and logistics of getting the current COC CapSets can be 
problematic for owners of these systems, as well as the maintenance and accountability of 
the parts. Although the CapSets are mobile, coming with two trailers, one for the 
generator, and the other for the communications suite, there are probably twenty to thirty 
additional separate containers that house the parts for rest of the COC.  
c. Opportunities  
Although outdated, there are still opportunities available using the current 
technology and equipment of the wired COC infrastructure. One is a reduction of future 
spending on IT equipment and technology. With the introduction of cloud computing, the 
need for newer computer equipment such as hard drives, memory, processing power, etc., 
is lessened because the cloud can handle all of those responsibilities remotely. A user 
may not be able to or even have to physically move his device in the current COC setup, 
because all of the data has the potential to be accessed from the cloud infrastructure. The 
benefit of the cloud has the potential to extend the life of current COC systems  
where money for IT programs can be redirected elsewhere. Higher data throughputs, 
reliability, and the security of a wired connection in the COC are always giving many 
communications planners the opportunity to expand a communications infrastructure out 
to the users and still maintain control of both the devices and services on that network. 
d. Threats 
One threat that exists is the lack of program support for the current COC 
CapSet systems due to dwindling DOD budgets and funding that would be needed to 
sustain maintenance and upgrades to legacy systems in the COC CapSets. There is also 
the potential threat that the legacy systems in the COCs will be too outdated, making 
them incompatible with newer advantageous IT technology that is currently available or 
projected in the future. In Albert’s (2000) Network Centric Warfare he states that the 
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“increasing availability and affordability of information, information technologies, and 
information Age weapons increases the potential for creating formidable foes from 
impotent adversaries” (p. 19). This can cause for a deterioration of any information 
dominance or advantages previously afforded by current technology and legacy systems 
in the CapSets, creating a disadvantage against current or potential adversaries who adopt 
these newer IT technologies (Albert, 2000).  
2. Wireless  
a. Strengths  
Some strengths of adopting a wireless connection are the potential for an 
increase in flexibility, mobility, and scalability in a communications network. 
Incorporating a wireless solution allows the communications planner to grow and expand 
on the network architecture more easily and quickly because of the absence of additional 
physical installation that goes with a wired connection. It also allows for a quicker 
installation and is conducive to any sudden infrastructure modifications, device location 
changes, and increase in users. A wireless network’s rapid ability to deploy expected or 
unexpected services reduces friction and decreases the use of messy wire runs and any 
installation difficulties or complexities associated with physically installing wires to the 
device and user. There is also the potential to extend networking capabilities outside the 
range of the COC to other authorized users within reach of the AP. 
b. Weakness  
Security has long been a concern and a weakness of wireless 
communications. The belief is that an unauthorized user can easily gain access or disrupt 
communications inside a network if he is able to get close enough to the AP. WLANs are 
a collection of wireless devices that are capable of maintaining connectivity with one 
another while transferring data without disruption (Ravichandiran & Vaithiyanathan, 
2009). Ravichandiran and Vaithiyanathan (2009) discuss two fundamental configurations 
for wireless networks, peer-to-peer (P2P) and peer-to-multipoint (P2Mp). One of the 
issues with P2P configurations is that the two communicating endpoints must be close 
enough to mitigate the effects of RF interference or signal loss in order to communicate 
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effectively and with increased reliability (Ravichandiran & Vaithiyanathan, 2009). In 
P2Mp one centralized administrator, serving as the hub, associates with multiple nodes 
consisting of multiple wireless devices (Ravichandiran & Vaithiyanathan, 2009). An 
issue with P2Mp configuration is that connections are dependent upon the distance 
between the wireless devices, creating a region where the devices must stay within in 
order to prevent disruption of communication (Ravichandiran & Vaithiyanathan, 2009). 
Although these Wi-Fi networks can be quite inexpensive to install, the fact that the 
device’s technology is dependent on line of sight (LOS) creates vulnerability 
(Ravichandiran & Vaithiyanathan, 2009). The problem comes when obstacles are placed 
in the way of these devices obstructing clear LOS and/or the proliferation of many 
wireless devices in a WLAN creating competition for resources such as throughput 
(Ravichandiran & Vaithiyanathan, 2009).  
Another weakness that wireless technology has is that it is very vulnerable 
to intentional and unintentional. The RF propagation effects discussed in Chapter II can 
sometimes (and most times are) out of the control of the communications planner and 
installer. Common appliances found inside or near COC’s such as a microwave, or metal 
concertina wires outside the COC, can cause distortion or interruption of the RF signals 
of a wireless network. 
Range and data transfer speeds of a WLAN has the potential to be a 
weakness depending on what type of usage requirements a unit may have. Some units the 
size of a battalion may have large demands for streaming video and/or exchanging files 
that can bottleneck a wireless network, or its needs may not be satisfied by a wireless 
network. Although technology has improved substantially in wireless communication, it 
is still much slower and less reliable than wired.  
With decreasing budgets, the future affordability of implementing a 
wireless solution may also be a weakness for some organizations. The ability to purchase 
a reliable, secure, commercial off-the-shelf COTS solution that meets all DoD 
specifications and requirements may come at a price that is unrealistically unattainable 
for an organization such as the Marine Corps. Research and development of a suitable 
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wireless solution may also be unachievable due to current and possibly future budget 
constraints. 
c. Opportunities 
A lot of attention has been given to the financial feasibility of acquiring or 
adopting newer information technology systems or programs, but wireless has the 
potential to save money for a DoD organization. An argument can be made for the ability 
to use personal devices such as a wireless laptop or smart phone on an enterprise network 
such as the MCEN. Organizations such as the Naval Postgraduate School have already 
installed and are currently operating networks that allow users to connect personal 
wireless capable devices securely to the NPS network infrastructure. This may not be a 
reliable solution for a highly sensitive classified network, but it is quite suitable for 
unclassified networks, especially in garrison environments on base. Adopting this 
strategy would force potential changes to current regulations and specifications that 
enforce security standards in the DoD, but it can be done.  
There is also the opportunity to cut costs associated with the installation 
and maintenance with a wired connection. Wired connections have the potential to 
deteriorate over time or be cut due to unforeseen circumstances associated with operating 
in dynamic environments where hot temperatures and heavy trafficked areas are 
common. Using wireless connections can be a viewed as a sort of automation to the 
installation process in that less labor is needed to operate, install, and maintain wireless 
devices, resulting in lower expenses. Using wireless has the potential to decrease or 
eliminate costs for manpower, training, and maintenance. It also eliminates the need for a 
lot of heavy equipment that is currently part of the COC CapSets which can have 
anywhere from twenty to thirty additional containers that need to be accounted for, 
maintained, and moved from place to place. Cargo space and its weight costs money 
when it comes to transporting equipment and by decreasing the bulky equipment needed 
to operate and install a wired infrastructure, a reduction in cost may ensue. Wireless 
technologies can eliminate the need for a lot of the bulky equipment currently being 
deployed in the COC CapSet models.  
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d. Threats 
One threat to using wireless technologies is its security, which potentially 
gives a determined adversary the ability to remotely disrupt services due to the 
advancements in wireless technologies and the readily available products that an attacker 
can acquire and use against a wireless infrastructure. Wireless attack tool kits such as the 
“Raspberry – PI” (shown in Figure 10), and instructions to use them are readily available 
to anyone who desires them. Although steps can be taking to safeguard against these type 
of devices within the immediate area, which are now being addressed with current 
information-awareness initiatives, disgruntled employees as well as an enemy can still 
use a tool such as the Raspberry – PI to perform attacks against a network from outside 
the controlled area or even inside the controlled area when considering an insider attack.   
 
Figure 10.   (From www.howtodocomputing.blogspot.com, n.d.)   
Wireless –PI is “a collection of pre-configured or automatically-
configured tools that automate and ease the process of creating robust 
Man-in-the-middle attacks. The toolkit allows you to easily select  
between several attack modes and is specifically designed to be easily 
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extendable with custom payloads, tools, and attacks. The cornerstone  
of this project is the ability to inject Browser Exploitation Framework 
Hooks into a web browser without any warnings, alarms, or alerts to 
 the user. We accomplish this objective mainly through wireless  
attacks, but also have a limpet mine mode with a few other tricks 
(www.howtodocomputing.blogspot.com, 2013). 
B. COMPARISON OF WI-FI AND WIRED  
Chiu, Y., Logman, Chiu, M., and Sunkara, (2005) discuss how wired and wireless 
technologies have continued to mature and innovate at an unbelievable rate (p. 3). Old 
technologies such as wire tend to be resilient, reliable, and robust even under harsh 
conditions and elements as well as offer high transfer speeds and data throughput (p. 3). 
Some 802.3 wire mediums such as CAT 5 may degrade and lose effectiveness over time 
and distance, but there are still faster and capable cables, such as fiber-optics, that can be 
employed over great distances and provide high rates of data throughput. Figure 11 
shows characteristics of some current wired technologies.  
Newer technologies such as wireless 802.11ac are starting to offer more speeds 
that are nearly comparable to wired connections while expanding on its ability to provide 
flexible configurations and other communications services (p. 3). Devices that work with 
wireless technologies have also decreased in size and weight along with increasing 
battery life to power the processers in these mobile devices.  
The current Marine Corps CapSets models were contracted in the early 2000s. 
The communication suites supported currently in the COC are all wire-based, CAT 5, 
fiber, twisted pair, etc. In 2009 General Dynamics was awarded a $54 million dollar 
contract to replace the aging systems (Defense Industry Daily Staff, 2009). Below is a 
comparison of the highlights of advantages and disadvantages for the COC and wireless 
technologies in order to give the acquisitions and/or communications planner a quick 




 Cost has already been spent to acquire, train, implement system 
into fleet 
 Interoperability with other Marine Cops communications devices 
and radio systems 
 Reliable and secure connections to the secure and non-secure LAN 
infrastructure 
b. Disadvantages 
 Outdated technologies 
 Big and bulky equipment (communications trailer house switch 
and routers) 
 Limited flexibility due to internal wiring of tables and other 
components in the COC. 
 External wiring to expand network can become cluttered and 
confusing 
 Numerous parts and SL-3 components can be a challenge to 





Figure 11.  Wired Technology Characteristics (From Chiu et al., 2005) 
2. Wireless 
a. Advantages 
 Technology promotes flexibility and mobility  
 Data speeds and throughput are more than efficient to support 
current Marine Corps bandwidth transmission mediums and pipes 
 Depending on budget limitations, option to purchase a wireless 
solution could save Marine Corps money and increase capability 
over current COC solution (section C in this thesis analyzes 
possible savings between the two technologies) 
 Technology allows for faster expandability of a network 
 Easier and neater installation 
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 Newer technology  
b. Disadvantages 
 Security issues with the technology 
 Vulnerable to interference and other propagation effects discussed 
in Chapter II 
 Not suitable for secure communications 
 Has to be acquisitioned during a time of budgets constraints 
 Limitations in bandwidth and throughput of current transmission 
systems do not support full capabilities of wireless technology.  
 
C. COST ANALYSIS WIRELESS VS WIRED COC 
Due to the potential sensitivity and proprietary nature of the data, some of the 
inputs/costs in this analysis will be done using fictional numbers in equipment, 
manpower, and costs to represent inputs/costs in order to keep the information in this 
document unclassified. The inputs/costs for wired technology for the COC and wireless 
technology solutions are based on estimates of unclassified historical and current 
comparative commercial market data as well as guesstimates of inputs/costs. A 
discussion of the data is provided to create a template that may allow for future 
researchers to easily re-create with sensitive pertinent data and calculations in their 
analyses. This data is intended only to give the acquisitions and/or communications 
planner and other invested decision-makers a close replica of what is needed to improve 
their understanding of the possible differences between wired and wireless 
communications.  
1. Manpower Cost Savings  
This data was created with the assumption that one enlisted Marine with 
the base pay grade of E-3 is the primary operator and installer of wire and associated 
equipment in a COC CapSet model. Table 6 shows the calculations for current and 
wireless manpower.  
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a. Current Manpower  
 10 x E-3 wireman make up an fictional BN 
 30 x E-3 wireman make up an fictional RGT 
 90 x E-3 wireman make up an fictional DIV 
 270 x E3 wireman make up an fictional MEF 
b. Wireless Manpower (half of current manpower) 
 5 x E-3 wireman make up an fictional BN 
 15 x E-3 wireman make up an fictional RGT 
 45 x E-3 wireman make up an fictional DIV 
 135 x E3 wireman make up an fictional MEF 
  
Current Manpower 
  Costs  Month  Year 
 1 E3 $3,500.00 $42,000.00 
BN 10 E3 $35,000.00 $420,000.00 
RGT 30 E3 $105,000.00 $315,000.00 
DIV 90 E3 $315,000.00 $3,780,000.00 
MEF 270 E3 $630,000.00 $7,560,000.00 
    
Wireless Manpower  
 Costs Month Year 
 1 E3 $3,500.00 $42,000.00 
BN 5 E3 $17,500.00 $210,000.00 
RGT 15 E3 $52,500.00 $630,000.00 
DIV 45 E3 $105,000.00 $1,260,000.00 
MEF 135 E3 $472,500.00 $5,670,000.00 
Table 3.   Current Manpower and Wireless Manpower costs 
2. Maintenance Cost Savings  
This data was created based on 10 percent estimate of the contract cost of 
the initial investment of the COC CapSet contract of $650 million (Defense Industry 
Daily Staff, 2009). 
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a. Current Maintenance 
  1 x COC make up total systems in an fictional BN 
 3 x COC make up total systems in an fictional RGT 
 9 x COC make up total systems in an fictional DIV 
 27 x COC make up total systems in an fictional MEF 
b. Projected Maintenance 
 Costs are half of current costs 
 
Current Maintenance 
 Costs Month Year 
BN 1 COC $1,000.00 $12,000.00 
RGT 3 COC $30,000.00 $90,000.00 
DIV 9 COC $9,000.00 $108,000.00 
MEF 27 COC $27,000.00 $324,000.00 
    
Wireless Maintenance 
 Costs Month Year 
BN 1 COC $500.00 $6,000.00 
RGT 3 COC $15,000.00 $45,000.00 
DIV 9 COC $4,500.00 $54,000.00 
MEF 27 COC $13,500.00 $162,000.00 
Table 4.   Current Maintenance and Wireless Maintenance Costs 
3. Transportation Cost Savings 
This data was created based on a guesstimate of the weight, space, and 
cost of transporting one full 500 cubic feet of wired equipment per individual COC 
CapSet for one deployment. One iteration of a deployment counts as one deployment and 
one redeployment. The assumption has been made that a battalion deploys 1 time a year; 
a regiment deploys 2 battalions a year; a division deploys 4 battalions a year; and a MEF 
deploys 12 BN a year.   
a. Current Transportation 
 1 x depl make up a fictional BN 
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 2 x depl make up a fictional RGT 
 4 x depl make up a fictional DIV 
 12 x depl make up a fictional MEF 
b. Projected Transportation 
 Costs are half of current costs 
 
Current Transportation 
Costs Month Year 
1 move $5,000.00 $110,000.00 
BN	 1 depl $10,000.00 $220,000.00 
RGT	 2 depl $10,000.00 $220,000.00 
DIV	 4 depl $20,000.00 $440,000.00 
MEF	 12 depl $30,000.00 $660,000.00 
       
Projected Transportation 
 Costs Month Year 
 1 move $2,500.00 $55,000.00 
BN 1 depl $5,000.00 $110,000.00 
RGT 2 depl $5,000.00 $110,000.00 
DIV 4 depl $10,000.00 $220,000.00 
MEF 6 depl $15,000.00 $330,000.00 
Table 5.   Current Transportation and Wireless Transportation Costs 
4. Miscellaneous Operating Expenses 
 This data was created based on guesstimate of expenses involved in the 
installation and operation of wired equipment in a COC CapSet. One example of an 
expense considered in the inputs is cost for spools of CAT 5 cable. Ten percent of the 
estimate of the $54 million modification contract awarded to General Dynamics for 
modification of the existing COC CapSets was broken down yearly and calculated into 
the expenses cost (Defense Industry Daily Staff, 2009).  
a. Current Miscellaneous 
 Estimation of $2,000 misc. expenses X number of COCs in MEF 
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b. Projected Miscellaneous 
 Estimation of $2,000 misc. expenses X number of COCs in MEF 




other expenses $2000 x #depl(MEF) $24,000.00 
   
 Total Year $24,000.00 
     
Wireless Miscellaneous 
Costs  Year 
mod (10% contract)  $5,400,000.00 
other expenses MEF $1000 x #depl(MEF) $12,000.00 
 Total Year $5,412,000.00 
Table 6.   Current Miscellaneous and Wireless Miscellaneous Costs 
5. Total Cost Savings 
Total cost savings are calculated by taking the total differences between current 
(wired) and projected (wireless) for manpower, transportation, maintenance, and cost. 
These costs are added together to create the total cost savings for the year shown in Table 
7. 
Current Manpower  Wireless Manpower  Difference 
	$7,560,000.00		  $5,670,000.00   $(1,890,000.00) 
Current Maintenance  Wireless Maintenance  Difference 
 $324,000.00   $162,000.00   $(162,000.00) 
Current Transportation Wireless Transportation  Difference 
 $660,000.00   $330,000.00   $(330,000.00) 
   $(2,382,000.00) 
Current Miscellaneous  Wireless Miscellaneous  Difference 
 $24,000.00   $5,412,000.00   $5,388,000.00  
Table 7.   Total Cost Savings 
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6. Payback Period 
The payback period answers how long it will take to recoup money in savings 
from the technology (Anthens, 2003). Some of these savings should go on forever, but an 
argument can be made that those cost savings just transfer to other priorities in the 
Marine Corps. The data in Table 7 was used to calculate the data in Table 8. Table 8 
shows a comparison of payback periods for wired and wireless communications. The best 
option is determined by the least amount of time needed to break even or exceed the 













Table 8.   Comparison of Wired and Wireless Payback Periods 
D. REAL OPTIONS 
1. Keeping Current COC CapSets 
a. Strengths 
 In the short run, less expensive than acquiring a new solution 
 Still reliable, secure 
 Marines are well trained with the system 
b. Weaknesses 
 Outdated technologies 
 Bulky, beat-up equipment that needs to be refreshed 
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 May become incompatible with newer technologies that could 
potentially give the Marine Corps an information dominance 
disadvantage  
2. Acquisition of a Wireless Solution 
a. Strengths 
 Could be expensive in the short run 
 Addresses Marine Corps need of increasing mobility and flexibility 
 Ability to deploy, install, and expand networks faster 
b. Weaknesses 
 Security and vulnerability of these systems to both outside and 
inside threats are increased 
 Still costs money to acquire and maintain 
3. Combining Both Wired and Wireless Solutions 
Wired and wireless technologies can coexist and support each other. An option of 
acquisitioning a mixed wired and wireless solution while maintaining compatibility with 
current Marine Corps COC CapSet suites systems and capabilities could be a viable 
solution. 
a. Strengths 
 Less expensive than a new robust wireless-only acquisition 
 Adds all advantages of wireless solution while using current COC 
capabilities to cover some of the weaknesses of wireless 
b. Weaknesses 
 Newer technologies may be incompatible with outdated COC 
legacy systems 
 Still costs money to acquire and maintain 
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4. Other Possible Solutions 
a. Using the Cloud 
Hurwitz, Kaufman, Halper, and Kirsch (2012) describe cloud computing 
as a “method of providing a set of shared computing resources that includes applications, 
computing, storage, networking, development, and deployment platforms as well as 
business processes.” Cloud computing is a technology that can create opportunities and 
advantages for the Marine Corps. The DOD has taken note of the capabilities of cloud 
computing and the advantages and benefits that can be gained from implementing this 
technology into their wired COC infrastructure (Wald, 2010).  
The cloud offers advantages of elasticity and scalability of networks that 
can be designed to scale upwards and downwards on demand (Hurwitz et al., 2012). 
Another capability the cloud offers is that it is always available and accessible (Hurwitz 
et al., 2012). This offers an organization like the Marine Corps the ability for a unit to 
deploy or work from garrison to the battlefield seamlessly. Marine Corps units can easily 
access their data through a web based application from anywhere 24/7, without the need 
of an external removable storage device or deploying a users’ garrison workstation with 
them, possibly eliminating the need for establishing an elaborate communications IT 
infrastructure or COC. The cloud may not serve as a definite alternative to adopting a 
wireless solution because the benefits of the cloud can be obtained using either wired or 
wireless connections, but it may serve as support to the reasoning in abandoning the 
heavy server, router, and wires that are currently used to connect devices to the network.  
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V. SUMMARY 
With the evolution and introductions of the smart phone, tablet computers and 
other mobile connected devices in addition to the previous generation of desktop 
computers and VOIP phones, there has been an increase in demand for wireless mobile 
communications. Ravichandiran and Vaithiyanathan (2009) talk about factors such as the 
ones mentioned, that are driving the IEEE 802.11 wireless popularity in industry as well 
as the DoD. Once the footprint of devices grows so does the equipment needed to support 
those devices and possibly the personnel. Devices are now getting smaller and smaller 
and the demand for them to be wirelessly connected to the network has caught on 
throughout all sectors of industry. Ravichandiran and Vaithiyanathan (2009) believe this 
adoption of wireless changes the old way of thinking of how employees work in the 
workspace; they’re no longer tied to their desks. “Wi-Fi radios are appearing not in just 
laptops but also in equipment as diverse as mobile phones, parking meters, security 
cameras and home entertainment systems” (Ravichandiran & Vaithiyanathan, 2009). The 
number of wireless devices and the demand for mobile computing is projected to 
continue to grow this decade, with wireless technologies becoming smarter, cheaper, and 
more secure (Ravichandiran & Vaithiyanathan, 2009). Wireless looks to become the 
model way of communicating in the years to come. 
The problem right now is tied to funding. DoD organizations such as the Marine 
Corps are forced to be even better stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars. Budget 
sequestration and other financial constraints are forcing the Marine Corps, an already 
financially limited organization, to be very selective and critical of every dollar spent. 
The idea of doing more with less is propagating throughout the Marine Corps and 
programs are being cut. Lawlor (2004) discusses how funding many programs has been 
challenging giving the numerous budget cuts and financial reductions that hit the DoD. 
As a result, clashes between current operations and programs and future ones are causing 
competing priorities of which only a fraction can be funded (Lawlor, 2004).  
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This thesis looked at some of the costs associated with acquiring a wireless 
capability in comparison to current wired COC capabilities and other available options. If 
money is not an issue in the future, a strong recommendation can be made to adopt a 
wireless solution that will enhance the flexibility and expandability of the Marine Corps. 
Even with a relaxed or flexible budget to adopt a wireless solution, one should be 
acquired at an affordable price with the understanding that there is potential for cost 
savings and other benefits that can result from going wireless. The reduction in 
manpower costs is probably not that big of a deal because that is already being done in 
the Marine Corps. In the short run, the adoption of a wireless solution without cutting the 
manpower that operates and maintains this technology will just be realigned and 
prioritized to other areas.  
The COC CapSets were contracted in 2002 and a strong argument can be made 
that the technology is outdated. In the early 2000s wireless technologies were still fairly 
young in development and not as mature or secure as they are today. The backbone of 
most Marine communications’ network infrastructures are capped in bandwidth and 
throughput of the weakest system in the transmission scheme so having a big and fast 
wired or wireless bandwidth or throughput pipe is really a moot point. The system will 
only go fast as it is capable, so in my opinion a lot of weight should not be focused on 
bandwidth and throughput size because both technologies are more than adequately 
capable. In Chapters II and III, the strengths and weaknesses of introducing a wireless 
networking capability to Marine Corps COCs were discussed. One advantage of the 
wired COC CapSet models is that the Marine Corps already have these systems and 
compatible devices and radios to work with them. An argument can be made that this has 
the potential to be a disadvantage if other organizations like the Navy and Army, are able 
to acquire or have newer technologies, which can have an effect on joint interoperability 
and efficiencies when hardware and capabilities of the current wired COC CapSet suites 
are not able to keep up. Security is always of issue, but an argument can be made that 
wireless technology on an unclassified network in a physically secure COC on a forward-
operating base will have enough security controls to mitigate or negate the possibility of 
attacks from the outside. Inside attacks will be harder to defend against, but it would not 
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be any more difficult than that of a wired nature currently employed in the COC. The 
greatest benefit of wireless will be recognized when installing local area network 
connections such as those in the COC CapSets. 
This thesis focused on the technology, financials, benefits, limitations, and 
opportunities of adopting a new wireless solution in the COC in comparison to what 
capabilities and technologies are already available and paid for. A critical requirement 
that the Marine Corps fleets desired to fulfill by adopting a wireless infrastructure over a 
wired COC infrastructure was to give the acquisitions personnel, communications 
planner, and any other decision maker of limited familiarity of wireless technologies, 
information needed in order to give them a general understanding of wireless 
technologies to aid them in making an informed wireless acquisitions decision. This 
thesis aims to serve as a quick guidebook that professional and/or novices in wireless and 
wired communications can reference.  
Based on the analysis and research in this thesis an argument can be supported to 
continue operating the current wired COC CapSets because it allows the Marine Corps to 
eliminate any new costs and still affords the Marine Corps the technology and 
efficiencies it needs in order to stay effective on the battlefield. Although no new costs 
will be occurred in keeping current wired COC CapSets, the argument can be made that 
with the rapid adoption of wireless technologies by external organizations both 
commercial and government, the Marine Corps could quite possibly be missing out on 
some opportunities that would make COC operations more effective. A counter argument 
can be made that costs of these newer technologies will decrease significantly due to the 
saturation of wireless technologies on the market which will then allow the Marine Corps 
to take advantage of these technologies at lower prices.   
One area of interest that would help advance this thesis is in the adoption and 
implementation of a secure wireless technology that would support both classified and 
unclassified networks and systems. The items in this thesis were of a general nature to not 
divulge any sensitive systems, operations, and/or information in order to keep this thesis 
unclassified. With the rapid advancement of information technology the need to update 
and expand on this thesis should also be looked at for future research. 
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